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Abstract
As the excessive labour market segmentation has negatively affected China’s social and eco-
nomic development in many ways, this paper describes the status quo of China’s labour mar-
ket segmentation and the segmentation’s history since 2000. In addition, the paper analyzes 
institutional factors that affect labour market segmentation among different groups and as-
sesses the effects of specific policies that are closely related to the development of the labour 
market. More specifically, this paper reviews key labour market policies and programs in-
troduced during the last decade and analyzes the impact of the Minimum Wage Policy, the 
Labour Contract Law and the Household Registration System (hukou) on labour market seg-
mentation. At last, it offers several policy recommendations to reduce the China’s labour mar-
ket segmentation.
1. Introduction
Labour market segmentation is one of the 
core themes of economic theory and policy, 
as it is part of a wider set of studies examin-
ing the question of how the labour market in 
one country is operated, a subject of long-time 
interest to labour economists in the world. 
Since the introduction of economic reforms 
and the open-door policy, China has achieved 
substantial economic growth but also experi-
enced significant labour market segmentation, 
particularly since the late 1990s. Today, it is 
widely acknowledged that China is one of the 
world’s most segmented labour markets (Cai, 
et al., 2003), e.g. the separation of the labour 
market into sub-markets or segments.
 In China, the segmentation primarily con-
cerns different worker types, such as urban 
local workers vs. migrant workers, formal vs. 
informal workers and contract workers vs. 
dispatched workers (those employed through 
employment agencies on a temporary basis), 
although such workers perform the same du-
ties as regular workers. Therefore, China’s la-
bour market is primarily segmented into for-
mal and informal, regular and irregular and 
migrant and native workers in the different 
industries and occupations. Moreover, the ex-
cessive and increasing segmentation has neg-
atively affected China’s social and economic 
development in many ways. The increasing 
segmentation has eroded the social aware-
ness of equity and justice (Yao, 2004), caused 
increasing amount of social conflicts and fail-
ures of social cohesion (Li and Li, 2010), and 
resulted in increasing income inequality and 
employment discrimination for the disadvan-
taged groups (Li and Luo, 2010). Moreover, 
today, China is troubled by fundamental eco-
nomic structural imbalances that are closely 
associated with excessive segmentation, in-
cluding over-investment, a low consumption 
rate, over-saving, and a high dependence on 
external demand (Perkins, 2012).
In total, the segmentation of the Chinese la-
bour market is acknowledged by many labour 
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economists. However, the segmentation is di-
versified across sectors and population groups. 
Moreover, the effects of labour market seg-
mentation on unemployment, particularly for 
specific groups, and other aspects of labour re-
lations remain largely unanswered questions. 
These questions possess particular relevance 
in light of the recent global crisis. A better un-
derstanding of how segmented labour markets 
fared during the crisis is required. In addition, 
new policy responses must be sought.
This paper aims to describe the status quo 
of China’s labour market segmentation and 
the segmentation’s history since 2000. In ad-
dition, the paper analyzes institutional factors 
that affect labour market segmentation among 
different groups and assesses the effects of 
specific policies that are closely related to the 
development of the labour market. More spe-
cifically, this paper reviews key labour mar-
ket policies and programs introduced during 
the last decade and analyzes the impact of the 
Minimum Wage Policy, the Labour Contract 
Law and the Household Registration System 
(hukou) on labour market segmentation. The 
implications of these policies and programs 
for labour market segmentation are discussed. 
The paper primarily focuses on labour mar-
ket segmentation at the individual or house-
hold level and investigates how key institu-
tional factors affect the process and outcome 
of labour market seg-
mentation based on 
an analysis of micro-
economic datasets. 
The paper is struc-
tured as follows. The 
following section de-
scribes the evolution 
of institutional seg-
mentation in China. 
Section 3 provides a 
brief introduction to 
the datasets. Section 4 
evaluates the effect of 
policy on labour mar-
ket segmentation us-
ing the microeconomic datasets, and suggests 
institutional measures to address labour mar-
ket segmentation. Finally, section 5 summa-
rizes and offers policy recommendations re-
garding China’s labour market segmentation.
2 Evolution of Institutional 
Segmentation
2.1 Institutional segmentation types
Many factors account for labour market 
segmentation in China, including demograph-
ical, regional, and socio-economic factors. 
However, economists and sociologists agree 
that no single factor plays a fundamental role. 
As Aslund and Skans (2010) note, one deci-
sive but neglected factor that explains labour 
market segmentation is policy. Acemoglu et 
al. (2005) and Card (2002) also emphasise the 
important role of public policy in labour mar-
ket analysis. At present, many institutional 
factors restrict the development of the labour 
market, and, in China, institutional segmenta-
tion is the labour market’s main characteristic 
(Lai, et al., 2012). 
The institutional segmentation of China’s 
labour market has two dimensions: horizontal 
and vertical segmentation. 
Horizontal segmentation exhibits three as-
pects (Fig. 1), including ownership division, 
urban-rural dual separation and industry/oc-
Horizontal 
segmentation in 
labour market
Ownership 
segmentation
Urban-rural 
segmentation
Industry/occupation 
segmentation
Fig. 1. Labour market segmentation in the horizontal 
dimen sion
Source: own elaboration.
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cupation segmentation, as workers can’t mo-
bile freely between those segments.
In addition, we can divide the overall la-
bour market segmentation into three vertical 
dimensions, including urban-rural segmenta-
tion, sectional segmentation and institution 
segmentation (Fig. 2).
2.2 Basic labour institution and policy 
in China
Based on the institution/policy segmenta-
tion frame presented above, we discuss spe-
cific policies that affected the labour market 
segmentation in the past and continue to exert 
an effect today. In the last decade, China has 
introduced a series of development strategies 
and policies that aim to mitigate segmentation. 
Overall, these policies fall into two categories: 
general policies that indirectly affect labour 
market segmentation and specific policies that 
directly affect labour market segmentation.
General policies. Beginning in 2000, 
China introduced a series of regional develop-
ment strategies, including the Western Devel-
opment Strategy (2000), the Strategy to Re-
vive the Northeastern Industrial Base (2003), 
and the Strategy for the Central China Emer-
Vertical 
segmentation in 
labour market
Rural labor 
market
Informal section 
labor market
Formal section 
labor market
Secondary labor market
Urban labor 
market
Informal section 
labor market
Formal section 
labor market
Primary labor 
market
Fig. 2. Vertical segmentation in the Chinese labour market
Source: own elaboration.
gency (2006). In 2001, China also issued an 
Outline for Poverty Alleviation and the Devel-
opment of China’s Rural Areas (2001-2010). 
In addition, China launched the “Socialist New 
Countryside Construction” project to promote 
development in rural China and mitigate the 
urban-rural disparity. Moreover, the reform of 
the educational system has a significant effect 
on labour market segmentation because the 
tuition fee exemptions for compulsory educa-
tion and the expansion of college and voca-
tional education may affect the labour mar-
ket segmentation (Lu et al., 2012). Rural land 
system and resource system reforms have also 
been introduced in many provinces, which 
benefit rural inhabitants.
Special policies. Recently, the Chinese 
government issued Minimum Wage Rules 
(2004) and the Labour Contract Law (2007) 
and conducted many pilot projects regard-
ing the Wage Negotiation System in several 
coastal provinces. These measures were con-
sidered to be useful to protecting the rights of 
employees and had important implications for 
mitigating labour market segmentation. In ad-
dition, the residence registration system regu-
lations (hukou) have been relaxed to a certain 
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degree in most small cities and towns during 
the last decade. Moreover, since 2005, many 
prefecture-level cities have begun to abolish 
the strict hukou system. Recently, Chongq-
ing and Chengdu were approved as National 
Experimental Zones for Coordinating Urban-
rural Development, which allows the govern-
ments of the two cities to take further steps to 
reform the hukou system.
Labour Contract Law and its evolu-
tion. In 1994, China first passed the Labour 
Law, which was enacted on 1 January 1995. 
The new law established a unified legal frame-
work for labour relations and the safeguard-
ing of worker rights (Ho, 2006). The law ex-
panded on earlier labour regulations, such as 
the 1986 regulations on labour contracts, the 
1992 Trade Union Law, and the 1993 Regula-
tions on the Handling of Enterprise Labour 
Disputes. The law established equal rights 
in obtaining employment, the right to a safe 
workplace, the right to social insurance and 
welfare, the right to bring labour disputes 
for resolution, the right to a minimum wage, 
and the right to “equal pay for equal work.” 
Although the law’s implementation has been 
imperfect, the law has played an important 
role in establishing a legal basis for worker 
rights. Significantly, the law also established a 
framework for the equal treatment of workers 
across ownership sectors. In additional, the 
law permits the no-fault dismissal of workers 
in response to changing economic conditions, 
which facilitates economic restructuring (Cai 
et al., 2008).
However, ten years later, with the continu-
ing development of the economy structure, 
employment patterns have changed signifi-
cantly. Moreover, the Labour Law was too 
general to cope with labour relationships in 
practice, and the law was unable to address 
the new issues that emerged with the devel-
opment of the market economy, such as dis-
patch employment, free labour migration and 
collective bargaining by labour. Specifically, 
the number of new unemployed workers in-
creased as a result of the rural surplus (labour 
transformation, which shifted workers from 
rural to urban areas). Meanwhile, illegal em-
ployment relationships have substantially in-
creased because of the oversupply of labour 
during the past few years. 
The last two decades have witnessed the 
most important changes in China’s labour 
market policy, that is, the replacement of life-
long with contract-based employment and of 
government job assignment with the labour 
market. Such changes reflect the paradigmatic 
shifts in China’s labour policy in the reform 
era. 
To address the new problems of the labour 
market, individuals increasingly hope to re-
form the labour regulations and update the 
Labour Law to suit the new conditions. In ad-
dition, within the policy context of promoting 
economic growth while maintaining social sta-
bility, both policy and law have been coordi-
nated and augmented to stabilize labour rela-
tions and protect labour rights. 
Given the socioeconomic circumstances 
and the underdevelopment of the labour rules 
in China, the labour policy required updating 
to suit the new economy. Based on the recent 
socio-economic developments, the NPC com-
mittee introduced a new Labour Contract Law 
on 1 January 2008, which improved the regu-
lation of the labour contract system. Under the 
new labour policy paradigm, the role of law in 
labour relations and other labour-related af-
fairs has been strengthened (Ngok, 2008). 
The minimum wage policy and its 
evolution. At present, 80 percent of the 
countries in the world had the Minimum Wage 
Regulation, while it was firstly committed in 
China in 1984. Afterwards, China formally 
launched Labour Law of China on June, 1994 
to confirm the minimum wage institution by 
legislation. Since then, certain Chinese cities 
have implemented a minimum wage policy. 
Based on this practice, on 1 March 2004, a 
national minimum wage regulation was in-
troduced. Currently, almost all Chinese cities 
have a minimum wage standard according to 
the Minimum Wage Regulation. 
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Generally, according to the Minimum 
Wage Regulation, the minimum wage stan-
dard should consider inflation, the cost of liv-
ing, the average wage, unemployment and the 
economic development level. In addition, the 
municipal minimum wage should be adjusted 
regularly according to changes in economic 
conditions.
However, with respect to the policy’s prac-
tical implementation, as result of imbalances 
in employer-employee relations and an im-
perfect collective bargaining system, some en-
terprises attempt to circumvent the regulation 
in various ways. As a result, the real wages of 
a large number of workers remain below the 
minimum wage standard, which indicates that 
the law is not effectively implemented (Ngok, 
2008). In addition, certain enterprises extend 
the working hours and increase the labour in-
tensity, although these enterprises abide by 
the minimum wage regulation (Hou, 2012). 
Moreover, it is not clearly stipulated that the 
regulation applies in rural areas, so the wages 
of many low-skilled workers in rural enterpris-
es are below the minimum wage. Among the 
lowly educated workers, few are aware of the 
minimum wage regulation. Thus, they cannot 
use the regulation to protect their rights. Most 
importantly, in practice, China’s Minimum 
Wage Regulation is not strictly implemented 
because the punishment is insufficient to com-
pel enterprises to abide by the law (Ho, 2006).
After becoming aware of these problems, 
the Chinese government began to pay more 
attention to the minimum wage policy. Gener-
ally, the minimum wage policy has been some-
what more strictly implemented than before. 
In addition, the minimum wage has steadily 
increased annually since 1 January 2008. As 
shown in Figure 3, on average, the minimum 
wage level increased 14.3% from January 2008 
to January 2012, whereas it only increased ap-
proximately 7.8%, 11.1% and 12.4% in 1993-
1997, 1998-2002 and 2003-2007, respec-
tively. In general, from Fig. 3 and Tab. 1, the 
per-capita growth rate of the minimum wage 
since January 2008 has been much higher 
than during other periods.
The household registration system 
and its evolution. On 9 January 1958, the 
National People’s Congress approved of the 
Household Registration Regulation, which 
was a formal indication of establishment of 
hukou system from that time. At the very be-
ginning, China’s household registration sys-
tem was a kind of institution that used to col-
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Fig. 3. Annual minimum wage growth rate
Source: Author’s estimation based on NBS and local government websites.
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lect and record citizens’ information by central 
authority (Lu, 2003). Actually, it included 
population registration system and manage-
ment system, which was the same to other 
countries (Knight and Song, 1999). However, 
afterwards, the difference lied in that hukou 
system in China was added by some other 
special features. One of them was the “affili-
ated function”, and another was the “restric-
tion function”. Generally, affiliated function 
referred to various additional social welfare 
or benefits attached to the household registra-
tion system, while the “restriction function” 
was concerned with the restriction of migrants 
from rural to urban areas. After the establish-
ment of hukou system, the urban and rural 
households not only held different identities, 
but also enjoyed a different variety of social 
welfare, thus both the identity and social wel-
fare of urban and rural population have been 
identified, and the rural-urban migration and 
population mobility was also clearly limited 
from then on.
The evolution of hukou system. In 1958, 
the first hukou regulation was launched to for-
mally confirm the migration approval system 
in the form of law. According to the regulation, 
the migration from rural to urban areas was 
prohibited. Since then, the terms “rural huk-
ou” and “urban hukou” were put forward to re-
strict the migration from rural areas. It clearly 
stated that “farmers with rural hukou are not 
allowed to move to urban areas without the 
permission of public security departments”. 
With the transition from planned econo-
my to market economy in China after 1978, 
changes have taken place in China and more 
and more attention has been paid to the ur-
ban-rural hukou segmentation. Afterwards, 
the serious migration restriction was loosened 
because of social and economic pressures. And 
the rural hukou population were also allowed 
to migrate to urban areas and able to get ur-
ban hukou if they satisfied some certain strict 
conditions.
On July 1985, the ministry of public securi-
ty passed “the management rule of the tempo-
rary population in urban areas”, and it stated 
that the rural hukou population also had a le-
gitimacy to live in the urban areas.
Afterwards, a program of hukou system re-
form in urban areas was piloted in September 
1997, which clearly stated that hukou restric-
tion should be abolished gradually in China. 
More specifically, the rural population worked 
in cities for a certain number of years and had 
established residences for more than one year 
could apply for the urban hukou. And the ones 
who invested or bought commercial housing 
could also apply for the urban hukou in that 
city.
In May 2001, the State Council launched 
ten policies to activate the rural economy, 
which explicitly provisioned that rural hukou 
population who had formal jobs and estab-
lished residences in cities should be taken into 
consideration to get urban hukou.
In September 2003, the revised rule of the 
program on urban hukou reform requested 
that the direction of the hukou reform was to 
relax the constraints to ensure more of popula-
tion in rural areas to get urban hukou with the 
development of urbanization. It also allowed 
the local governments to launch the specific 
policies to promote the hukou system reform 
according to the conditions for themselves.
3 Datasets
The macro aggregate data analyzed in this 
paper was collected from the China Statisti-
cal Yearbook and the China Labour Statistical 
Yearbook issued by the NBS (National Bureau 
of Statistics) and the Ministry of Human Re-
sources and Social Security from 2006 to 2011. 
The data includes the demographic, economic 
and social characteristics of China’s provinces 
and cities. Additionally, the data provides in-
formation on many subjects, such as educa-
tion, the labour force, employment, industrial 
production, international trade, national ac-
counts, wages and prices.
The individual data used in this paper 
is drawn primarily from the Migrants Sur-
vey Data (MSD), which comprise part of the 
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population surveys conducted by the National 
Population and Family Planning Commission 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from 
2010 to 2012. This survey’s purpose was to 
examine employment, income, consumption 
and related economic issues in China. The 
survey was conducted in three stages in 2010, 
2011 and 2012. The data used in this paper is 
primarily from the second stage. Moreover, we 
confine our sample to individuals aged from 16 
to 60. After cleaning of the dataset for 2011, we 
finally obtain a total of 112,105 observations. 
For the dataset described above, a stratified 
random sampling method was used to collect 
the data, and survey was used to collect infor-
mation at the household and individual levels. 
The survey required the enumerators to visit 
the households to request the relevant infor-
mation. In addition, specific questions related 
to village-level information were included in 
questionnaires. In general, the questionnaire 
was used to collect information regarding, for 
example, family and individual labour migra-
tion, employment, income, expenditures and 
consumption. Importantly, the observations 
were spread in all the industries, ownerships 
and sectors et al. (Li and Luo, 2010), and the 
sample was sufficiently large to capture the 
main features of the workers in the Chinese 
labour market and the market’s segmentation.
4 Labour Market Policies’ Effects 
and Institutional Reforms
4.1 Labour Market Policies’ Effects
Theoretically, the strategies and policies 
mentioned above have some effect on the Chi-
nese labour market (Knight and Song, 1999; 
Liu, 2005). However, because of data inac-
cessibility and methodological problems, few 
studies have examined the effects of these pol-
icies in an empirical and rigorous manner. For 
instance, Knight and Song (1999), Liu (2005), 
and Zhang and Gao (2009) et al., must be up-
dated according to recent policy changes and 
newly accessible data and be integrated into 
a more comprehensive framework to obtain a 
general view of the effects of these policies.
Furthermore, according to our literature 
survey, there is a wide divergence between 
practical needs and policy research with re-
spect to Chinese labour market segmentation. 
On the one hand, for the sake of social equity 
and sustainable economic growth, China must 
strive to mitigate labour market segmentation. 
On the other hand, the current status and the 
future trend of labour market segmentation 
remain unclear, and solid data regarding the 
effect of the relevant policies remain insuffi-
cient.
The framework introduced below is not ex-
haustive with respect to all relevant policies. 
Only those policies and programs are consid-
ered that are clearly intended to affect labour 
market segmentation, have a nation-wide ef-
fect or large biased impacts on the labour mar-
ket. 
The effect of the minimum wage poli-
cy. The effect of the minimum wage policy on 
employment is analyzed as a factor that affects 
labour market conditions. However, their im-
pact of the minimum wage policy on wage in-
equality remains ambiguous in China. 
To our knowledge, only two theoretical 
papers have investigated the effect of mini-
mum wage regulation on wage inequality in 
China, with contradictory results. The first is 
Zhang and Gao (2009), which demonstrates 
that wage inequality decreases if the wages 
of low-skilled workers substantially increase. 
The second paper, by Ding (2010), uses non-
linear programming to demonstrate that the 
impact of the minimum wage on the labour 
market depends not only on the imposition 
of the minimum wage but also the control of 
certain social factors. If the implementation is 
intensified beyond a certain point, the impact 
of the minimum wage on the labour market 
will inevitably be substantial. Additionally, 
Ding finds that the low-wage enterprises suf-
fer larger damage from the new minimum 
wage policy in the short term, which reduces 
the labour demand and subsequently worsens 
the wage distribution. 
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Several empirical papers have been devoted 
to evaluating the effect of the minimum wage 
policy on employment and income inequal-
ity. For example, Du and Pan (2009) found 
that the policy does not effectively influence 
the employment and income distribution, al-
though the coverage and the level of the mini-
mum wage standard have improved in recent 
years. The current policy, which relies on the 
monthly wage rate, is insufficient because 
certain workers tend to work more hours. 
Therefore, Du and Pan suggest that in prac-
tice the hourly wage rate is more appropriate 
than the monthly rate. In contrast, Luo and 
Cong (2009) construct an equilibrium model 
with a panel dataset in China and find that 
the minimum wage promotes wage growth in 
low-wage enterprises, such as construction 
and manufacturing. Generally, the policy has 
a small positive effect on the wage level of the 
low-income population, which substantially 
improves wage inequality.
Li and Luo (2011) conclude that increas-
ing the minimum wage will improve the wage 
level of the low-income population and help 
narrow the wage inequality. However, this ap-
proach can have negative results if improperly 
implemented. For example, raising the wage 
level by administrative means without consid-
ering supply and demand in the labour mar-
ket and the wage distribution in local markets 
will result in a series of adverse effects, e.g., 
an increased unemployment rate for the less-
educated group. Thus, this approach is unable 
to increase the number of jobs available to the 
low-income group and narrow the income in-
equality, and it may decrease the low-income 
population’s employment and increase the in-
equality.
Generally, the literature agrees that new 
minimum wage policy affects the wage of indi-
viduals. However, the question of who benefits 
more within a group remains unclear. That is, 
the impact of the minimum wage policy on 
employment and wage inequality remains am-
biguous. 
To examine whether the minimum wage 
policy is relevant to the disadvantaged (e.g., 
dispatched workers, migrants, workers with-
out labour contracts and workers in small pri-
vately owned enterprises in specific industries 
or occupations), we address the following ana-
lytical issues: How strictly is the policy imple-
mented, particularly with respect to disad-
vantaged workers? Who are more likely to be 
low-wage earners (with wages below the mini-
Tab. 1 Probit model for low-wage workers (migrants)
Minimum wage standard 
in 2009
Minimum wage standard 
in 2011
Coefficient Z value Marginal 
effect
Coefficient Z value Marginal 
effect
Mean
sexm -1.0499 -31.16*** -0.0307 -1.0677 -49.83*** -0.0951 0.5738
age -0.1208 -11.17*** -0.0032 -0.1213 -16.9*** -0.0099 33.8242
sage 0.0019 12.89*** 0.0000 0.0019 18.72*** 0.0002 1221.09
edul1 -2.2367 -7.73*** -0.0250 -2.7041 -13.69*** -0.0872 0.0192
edul2 -1.7438 -12.16*** -0.0239 -1.9023 -22.32*** -0.0815 0.0466
edul3 -1.5030 -13.65*** -0.0226 -1.1643 -20.57*** -0.0635 0.0567
edul4 -1.0908 -17.85*** -0.0204 -0.9730 -25.6*** -0.0605 0.1377
edul5 -0.7157 -20.37*** -0.0198 -0.5797 -23.72*** -0.0490 0.5565
_cons -0.8852 -1.13 1.1653 3.21***
N=102216; LR chi2=5801.24 N =102216; LR chi2=12511.16
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Many control variables are neglected in the table. For more information, please contact with the authors.
Source: Estimating data using MSD data set.
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mum wage)? To answer the first question, we 
compute the share of workers who are paid less 
than the minimum wage using the MSD data 
from the 2009 and 2011 surveys. In addition, 
we calculate the share of the urban workers 
in 2009 as a control group. The results indi-
cate that among the workers whose wages are 
lower than the minimum wage the proportion 
of migrants is substantially higher than that of 
urban workers. For instance, 18% of all of the 
migrant workers surveyed earned a monthly 
wage below the minimum wage in 2009 com-
pared with only 5% of the urban workers for 
the same year. This outcome implies that the 
policy is not well implemented, particularly for 
migrant workers. Additionally, 16% of the dis-
patched workers earned less than the monthly 
minimum wage in 2009 compared with only 
7% of the contract workers.
To answer the second question, we esti-
mate the probability of workers falling into the 
low-wage group (a wage below the minimum 
wage) using the probit model. The dependent 
Tab. 2 Probit regression model for low-wage population (urban workers)
Minimum wage standard in 2009 Minimum wage standard in 2011
Coeffi-
cient
z value Marginal 
effect
Mean Coeffi-
cient
z value Marginal 
effect
Mean
head -0.5260 -10.62*** -0.0121 0.4649 -0.5282 -15.67*** -0.0337 0.4649
sexm -0.4952 -9.97*** -0.0119 0.5549 -0.6157 -18.13*** -0.0412 0.5549
age -0.2410 -14.98*** -0.0056 40.8209 -0.2203 -18.34*** -0.0142 40.8207
sage 0.3000 15.06*** 0.0070 17.5097 0.2697 18.15*** 0.0174 17.5095
edul1 -1.5265 -10.5*** -0.0245 0.1876 -1.9385 -18.36*** -0.0814 0.1877
edul2 -1.2562 -10.76*** -0.0229 0.2488 -1.4013 -15.95*** -0.0699 0.2488
edul3 -0.9069 -7.63*** -0.0155 0.1089 -0.8963 -10.07*** -0.0433 0.1089
edul4 -0.4885 -4.83*** -0.0101 0.2364 -0.4996 -6.28*** -0.0289 0.2363
edul5 -0.2148 -2.18** -0.0047 0.1986 -0.1706 -2.18** -0.0105 0.1986
_cons 0.1616 0.3 1.3791 3.79***
Observa-
tions
53499 53486
LR Chi2 9188.51 4371.21
Note: Many control variables are neglected in the table. For more information, please contact with the authors. * 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: The data of urban natives comes from urban household survey in 16 provinces in 
2009. 
variable (y) is a dummy 1 if the worker belongs 
to the low-wage group and otherwise 0. The 
independent variables include the following: 
individual characteristics (age, gender and 
education), employment characteristics (own-
ership, occupation and industry), and regional 
variables (province dummies). The results of 
the estimation can be found in Table 1 for mi-
grant workers and Table 2 for local residents.
Based on the results of our probit model es-
timation, we can make the following conclu-
sions. First, the probability of falling into the 
low-wage group for female workers is much 
larger than for their male counterparts. More-
over, the gender gap is significantly larger for 
migrant workers than for urban workers. Spe-
cifically, the probability of belonging to the 
low-wage group for females is 1%-4% higher 
than for males if we use the urban sample and 
approximately 3%-10% for the migrant sam-
ple. Second, there is a U-shaped relationship 
between age and the probability of falling into 
the low-wage group, which indicates that the 
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probability first decreases with age and then 
increases. Third, the educational level and the 
probability of falling into the low-wage group 
are negatively related: i.e. the higher a work-
er’s education is, the lower the probability of 
falling into the low-wage group, particularly 
for the urban samples. Fourth, the probability 
of falling into the low-wage group varies sub-
stantially across regions, particularly for the 
urban samples.
Our estimation results demonstrate that 
young females and old workers with less edu-
cation are more likely to fall into the low-wage 
group. That is, the unemployment rate of these 
groups is higher compared with other groups. 
Therefore, these groups will be the first vic-
tims and lose their jobs if the minimum wage 
is raised. 
Regarding the relationship between the 
minimum wage standard and unemployment, 
this paper does not find evidence that the min-
imum wage standard affects unemployment. 
However, this outcome does not mean that the 
government could further raise the minimum 
wage standard. There are two possible reasons 
for the uncertain relationship. One reason is 
that the minimum wage in China is too low. 
Another reason is that the minimum wage pol-
icy was not strictly implemented in the past. In 
the case of the extremely low minimum wage, 
the relationship between wage and unemploy-
ment is no longer significant. If the minimum 
wage is too low to be useful, its effect on un-
employment will not be significant. However, 
because the local governments have competed 
to a considerable extent with respect to raising 
the minimum wage during the last four years, 
in both cases described above, the circum-
stances are changing.
The impact of the Labour Contract 
Law. After the new Labour Contract Law was 
adopted in 2008, there have been numerous 
studies (and debates) on the law with regard 
to the labour market segmentation. Certain 
studies, such as Zhang et al. (2008), believe 
that the labour contract law increases the la-
bour cost and is the fundamental reason for 
the large scale of enterprise bankruptcy and 
unemployment among the less-educated pop-
ulation. Moreover, the low-income population 
was affected first and most seriously by the la-
bour contract law revision of 2008, particular-
ly the irregular and dispatched workers. Thus, 
Zhang et al. conclude that the revised labour 
contract law actually strengthens labour mar-
ket segmentation.
Moreover, Chen and Funke (2009) provide 
a theoretical framework for the inter-linkages 
between the labour contract law and employ-
ment. They demonstrate that the new labour 
contract law has only a small effect on employ-
ment in the fast-growing Chinese economy. 
Rather, induced unit labour cost increases may 
adversely affect employment and increase the 
income inequality.
In contrast, Wang et al. (2009) believe that 
the new labour contract law offers workers 
increased employment security and income 
protection because the law encourages work-
ers to use the courts and the trade unions to 
press their claims. Additionally, Becker and 
Elfstrom (2010) emphasize the increasing 
number of labour contracts because of the new 
labour contract law. They also suggest that the 
government officials and the trade union cad-
res must focus not only on contract coverage 
but also the process of signing contracts on the 
basis of the new law.
We summarize the effect of the current la-
bour contract law in China as follows.
First, one group directly affected by the new 
Labour Contract Law is the enterprises that 
employ dispatched workers. There enterpris-
es are required to revise their arrangements 
with dispatched workers and cease to employ 
dispatched workers in positions that are not 
temporary, ancillary or alternative. (The term 
“labour dispatch” refers to the practice of hir-
ing employees through an employment service 
agency as opposed to direct employment). The 
enterprises must directly hire these staff mem-
bers or consider alternative solutions, such as 
outsourcing businesses, which engaged a large 
number of dispatched employees under the 
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previous legal regime (Ellison and Sun, 2012).
Second, certain small or medium-sized 
firms are likely to close if they do not meet the 
new requirements for obtaining official per-
mits. Although certain large firms may find it 
easier to obtain the permits, their businesses 
are likely to shrink significantly because these 
firms will no longer be able to employ a large 
number of employees under an informal ar-
rangement (Hou, 2012).
Third, “equal pay for equal work” is a prin-
ciple of the current Labour Contract Law. In 
practice, less favorable pay and employment 
benefits for the segmented workers are com-
mon. To prevent this practice, the new law 
states that the compensation paid to the seg-
mented workers must be consistent with the 
principle of equal pay for equal work: i.e., the 
same wages paid to a contract worker must be 
paid to a dispatched worker in the same or a 
similar position. Furthermore, the new law re-
stricts the use of dispatched workers by stipu-
lating that the related benefits and subsidies 
should also be provided to employees even in 
temporary, ancillary or alternative positions. 
In addition, the law specifies the definitions 
of “temporary”, “ancillary” and “alternative”, 
which were not clearly defined in the previous 
Labour Contract Law.
Fourth, many unskilled workers must re-
turn to their rural villages because it is impos-
sible to find a job in the urban labour market. 
Under the current Labour Contract Law, the 
informal employment of unskilled work-
ers without labour contracts by certain small 
or medium-sized firms is no longer allowed. 
Therefore, the enterprises must dismiss such 
low-productivity workers because of the in-
creasing labour cost. 
Fifth, the current Labour Contract Law pro-
motes the relocation and upgrading of the in-
dustries. Under the new law, enterprises must 
substitute capital for labour because of the 
increasing labour cost. Therefore, more and 
more enterprises in the coastal areas must re-
locate to regions where labour costs are lower 
and upgrade from labour-intensive industries 
to capital-based industries. Meanwhile, cer-
tain employers will be required to close their 
enterprises and shift to other cities in the 
western regions (Lai et al., 2012).
Sixth, the rights of workers in small pri-
vately owned enterprises are substantially bet-
ter protected and guaranteed than previously. 
The employers must pay their employees on 
time and in full in accordance with the new 
Labour Contract Law. If the employer fall into 
arrears with remuneration or fail to pay in full, 
the employee may apply to the local People’s 
Court for an order to pay. Moreover, accord-
ing to the current Labour Contract Law, the 
employers must strictly implement the work 
quota standards and neither directly or indi-
rectly forces employees to work overtime. If 
the employers require the employees to work 
overtime, the overtime must be compensated 
in accordance with the relevant regulations. 
Moreover, most of the segmented workers (e.g. 
dispatched workers, migrants and workers 
without labour contracts) in privately owned 
enterprises experienced uncompensated over-
time work in the past. Thus, the current new 
law’s updated overtime regulations improve 
the rights of segmented workers. 
The effect of the household registra-
tion system on the labour market. To a 
large extent, the unequal allocation of social 
resources is the main reason for the ownership 
segmentation and the urban-rural inequality. 
In the ownership and urban-rural segmenta-
tion structure, a social resource is not distrib-
uted by the market but by the government ac-
cording to the principles of dual segregation 
(Lu, 2003). At first, the implementation of the 
hukou system was supported by the rationing 
system, which was established in 1955. Under 
the rationing system, staples, such as grain, 
meat, cooking oil, sugar and cotton, could only 
be purchased in state-owned shops using ra-
tion coupons. Disadvantaged individuals, such 
as workers in privately owned enterprises, ru-
ral residents and dispatched workers, were 
excluded from the rationing system, which re-
sulted in inequalities in income and access to 
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basic consumer products.
Today, only those individuals who hold ur-
ban hukou and work in state organs, public 
institutions, and natives in large state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) can access the complete 
array of state-supplied social services. Individ-
uals who hold rural hukou in small privately 
owned enterprises cannot access all social ser-
vices. Residents with urban hukou have better 
resources and the advantages of various types 
of monetary subsidy, labour welfare, health 
insurance and other preferential privileges. In 
contrast, individuals with rural hukou cannot 
use these resources, which directly increase 
the urban-rural segmentation.
In addition to the effects described above, 
the policy could also produce certain serious 
social effects. Today, discrimination between 
urban and rural hukou is common in China, 
particularly when individuals are seeking em-
ployment. Individuals who hold rural hukou 
receive lower wages than those who hold ur-
ban hukou, even when abilities and work po-
sitions are the same (Alexander and Chan, 
2004). More importantly, to guarantee a sta-
ble high urban employment rate in certain 
cities, direct administrative measures are em-
ployed to restrict the migration of farmers to 
the cities or prevent them from entering the 
more desirable industries and jobs. In addi-
tion, certain economic instruments are delib-
erately used to increase the migration cost. 
For instance, migrant workers are required to 
pay a management fee if they wish to migrate 
to a city. Moreover, migrants face discrimina-
tory treatment in social services, rights protec-
tion and employment, although they may have 
the same abilities as their non-migrant coun-
terparts (Lu, 2003) and are restricted to spe-
cific industries and occupations in the labour 
market.
Overall, strong evidence of hukou discrimi-
nation is found when comparing the treat-
ment of the migrants and the natives. In sum, 
although the hukou system has been weak-
ened as a migration control tool, the system 
continues to discriminate against the rural 
hukou population and places temporary rural 
migrants in a disadvantageous social and eco-
nomic position.
4.2 Further Institutional Reforms
Reforming the social security system. 
Our data demonstrate that most of the dis-
patched workers are employed for less than 
one year and that the mobility rate of migrant 
workers is also very high. Furthermore, the 
mobility rate for segmented workers (e.g. the 
dispatched workers, the migrants and work-
ers without labour contracts) was even higher 
during the financial crisis. Given the integrated 
social security system, the segmented workers 
are unable to transfer their social security sta-
tus when they move to another city. Therefore, 
increasing the portability of social security is 
highly important for the segmented work-
ers. Additionally, we suggest that the security 
level be increased for the segmented workers 
to narrow the striking gap in the social secu-
rity level between different population groups. 
Moreover, the government at all levels should 
contribute more to raising the subsidy for the 
segmented workers in the labour market. 
Enforcement of the labour market 
legislation. According to the requirements 
of the 12th Five-Year National Development 
Plan, China should strengthen the enforce-
ment of the legislation that is already in place. 
In particular, all levels of government should 
introduce related local legislation with respect 
to community services, pension services and 
other labour services. Additionally, all levels 
of government should encourage enterprises, 
community service agencies and NGOs to de-
velop and introduce internal legislation.
Moreover, improving the bottom-up and 
top-down mechanisms to encourage grass-
roots labour sectors and departments to par-
ticipate in the formulation of industry legis-
lation is highly important. Finally, we should 
coordinate related legislation and transfer 
successful local legislations to the national lev-
el and advance the integration of the national 
legislative system.
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Strengthening the collective bargain-
ing mechanism. On the one hand, it has 
been suggested that the position and the col-
lective bargaining capacity of the trade unions 
in the labour market should be improved. 
First, the independence of the unions should 
be strengthened to establish a genuine prin-
cipal-agent relationship between the unions 
and their members, which should increase the 
incentive of the unions to accomplish their 
membership’s goals. Additionally, more trade 
unions should be established in the non-pub-
lic enterprises, and more attention should be 
paid to protecting the labour rights of part-
time staff.
On the other hand, the government should 
grant NGOs increased freedom to assist vul-
nerable workers, e.g. to support the establish-
ment of resident and villager associations and 
other organizations, to strengthen the collec-
tive bargaining capacity and safeguard the 
rights of these workers.
Additionally, the collective bargaining 
mechanism should be improved to ensure that 
employers and employees obtain fair results 
with respect to wage distribution and rights 
protection. To help the enterprises, trade 
unions, and employees understand the role 
of collective bargaining, knowledge and train-
ing should be provided on how collective bar-
gaining is practiced. Finally, relevant laws and 
regulations regarding collective negotiation 
should be established and improved to better 
guarantee worker rights in the future.
5 Conclusions and Policy 
Recommendations
5.1 Conclusions
Segmentation categories. Based on the 
analysis of the different characteristics of the 
labour market, we summarize China’s labour 
market segmentation from different perspec-
tives. Generally, the segmentation could be 
divided into two categories: horizontal and 
vertical segmentation (Fig. 4). The horizontal 
segmentation reflects four perspectives widely 
adopted to distinguish population groups, in-
cluding the urban-rural perspective, the own-
ership perspective, the industrial/occupation 
perspective, and other specific groups. Addi-
Labor market 
segmentation 
Vertical 
Segmentation 
Institutional factors 
Non-institutional factors 
Horizontal 
Segmentation 
Between urban and rural areas, within rural 
areas, and within urban areas 
Among different ownership types 
Among industries or occupations 
Specific groups (by gender, education, etc.) 
Fig. 4. Segmentation categories in China’s labour market
Source: own elaboration.
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tionally, we distinguish between institutional 
and non-institutional segmentation in the ver-
tical perspective. The institutional factors in-
clude various national development strategies 
and policies related to labour market develop-
ment, whereas the non-institutional factors 
include urbanization, industrialization and 
the economy’s degree of openness.
Generally, the horizontal and vertical cat-
egories capture the sources and the factors 
that affect labour market segmentation. De-
composing the segmentation between popu-
lation groups provides intuitive knowledge 
regarding the sources of segmentation. Distin-
guishing the segmentation into institutional 
and non-institutional aspects helps us better 
understand the priorities for policy interven-
tion and clarify the factors that result in the 
segmentation.
Labour market segmentation and its 
extent. Institutional constraints divide the 
labour market into two or more parts with dif-
ferent characteristics. In addition, there are 
obvious differences between the parts in terms 
of the wage determination mechanism, job 
stability and worker promotion opportunities, 
and the disadvantaged workers have more 
difficulty in moving between different mar-
kets. Therefore, the primary segmentation is 
reflected to a greater degree by the difference 
between workers in terms of, for example, em-
ployment opportunities, wage determination 
and accessibility to social services. Initially, 
the segmentation was limited to migrants 
and dispatched workers. Then, the temporary 
contract system was extended to other work-
ers. Generally, segmented workers (e.g. dis-
patched workers, migrants, workers without 
labour contracts and workers in small private-
ly owned enterprises in specific industries or 
occupations) are young and low skilled, and 
female workers are over-represented.
It is agreed that the labour market is seg-
mented. However, the extent of the segmen-
tation is an open question. Based on national 
representative household survey data, this pa-
per analyzes the extent of the labour market 
segmentation by comparing urban and rural 
areas, different enterprise ownership types, 
industries, occupations and other specific 
population groups. 
Moreover, the sub-markets display a mark-
edly different structure according to owner-
ship type, labour contracts, industry and oc-
cupation, and the wage and labour allocation 
mechanisms of the sub-markets differ signifi-
cantly. In general, the primary market has a 
formal internal labour market within enter-
prises, which is regulated by a set of detailed 
rules and procedures to guide employment 
activities. However, the segmented market is 
consistent with the circumstances described 
in neo-classical economics, whereby the enter-
prises pay a worker market wages according to 
the worker’s marginal contribution and mar-
ginal cost in the competitive labour market.
Overall, the labour mobility between the 
two markets for the segmented workers (e.g., 
dispatched workers, migrants, workers with-
out labour contracts and workers in small 
privately owned enterprises in specific indus-
tries or occupations) is subject to strict con-
trol. However, with the development of labour 
market, the social security system, household 
registration and related labour regulations will 
improve, and the awareness of the employers 
and the social organizations (labour unions) 
regarding labour laws should increase. There-
fore, we expect that labour market segmenta-
tion for the disadvantaged will be eased in the 
long term.
The factors that affect labour market 
segmentation. Labour market segmenta-
tion theory offers a persuasive explanation 
of certain segmentation phenomena that oc-
cur in fully developed economies. However, 
China is in a transition from a planned to a 
market economy. Market power has only re-
cently begun to demonstrate its effects, and 
the labour market remains immature. There-
fore, segmentation displays different forms: 
market segmentation because of the distorted 
industrial structure and monopolistic enter-
prises and institutional segmentation because 
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of inappropriate policies and regulations. In 
particular, institutional segmentation in Chi-
na appears to differ from such segmentation 
in other developed countries because the Chi-
nese institutional arrangement is artificially 
designed for non-economic purposes. There-
fore, we further analyze the influence of policy 
and institutions on labour market segmenta-
tion in China. Using various decomposition 
tools and econometric methods, the paper 
sought to identify the sources of the segmen-
tation in China and to examine institutional 
and non-institutional factors in explaining the 
segmentation.
Based on the analysis, we conclude that 
many factors, including an individual’s (or a 
family’s) demographic and employment char-
acteristics, industrial and ownership charac-
teristics, a community’s social environment 
and government programs have shaped the 
labour market segmentation. Additionally, the 
economic structure, the initial conditions, and 
labour market institutions and policies have 
contributed to labour market segmentation. 
Generally, labour market policies, hukou 
system reforms, the deregulation of the prod-
uct market, and reforms in the production 
resources market are thought to have an im-
mediate impact on the segmentation. Addi-
tionally, fiscal and taxation policies, the estab-
lishment of the social security system, public 
services policies, and social transfer schemes 
for socially vulnerable groups and less devel-
oped regions have significant implications for 
labour market segmentation. Moreover, this 
paper has comprehensively analyzed these 
factors and their dynamic effect to reveal the 
mechanisms of China’s labour market seg-
mentation.
5.2 Policy recommendations 
Worker training. At present, there are a 
large number of segmented workers in China, 
such as dispatched workers, migrants, work-
ers without labour contracts and workers at 
small privately owned enterprises in specific 
industries or occupations. These workers lack 
the education and skills to meet the needs of 
technological progress and future economic 
restructuring. Therefore, the segmented work-
ers should be provided training or educational 
opportunities to improve their skills and in-
crease their ability to acquire new knowledge 
and adapt to modern technology and new in-
dustrialization.
In particular, the central and local govern-
ments should initiate new training programs 
and improve existing programs for these 
workers. In particular, the quality of training 
should be improved. Additionally, non-profit 
training institutions should be treated pref-
erentially, and financial subsidies should be 
increased to reduce the cost of living. Finally, 
the vocational skills training program and the 
national vocational qualification certificate 
system should be combined to encourage seg-
mented workers to participate in the training 
programs.
Subsidizing vocational education. 
Vocational schooling is an important means 
to train skilled workers in China and could 
be greatly expanded. For example, additional 
highly skilled farmers could be trained to work 
with modern agricultural technology, which 
would support human capital accumulation in 
agriculture, new village construction and rural 
economic development. Additionally, expand-
ed vocational training could provide modern 
skilled workers for the urban industries. More 
importantly, updating and upgrading the vo-
cational schools would help increase worker 
abilities and wage levels and thus reduce the 
segmentation in the urban labour market. 
Therefore, the government should consider 
subsidizing vocational education. 
Reforming the hukou policy. The 
household registration policy is the simplest 
and most fundamental system relevant to Chi-
na’s labour market segmentation because the 
policy discriminates against the segmented 
workers (e.g. dispatched workers, migrants, 
workers without labour contracts and workers 
in small privately owned enterprises in specif-
ic industries or occupations). Under the poli-
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cy, the segmented workers are not treated the 
same as other workers with respect to employ-
ment opportunities, wage determination and 
access to social services. Thus, the policy forc-
es such workers to reside on the urban mar-
gins and in social isolation. Additionally, the 
discriminatory hukou policy results in dual or 
multiple segmentations, which cause labour 
immobility and a striking income inequality. 
Therefore, the hukou system’s reform and the 
establishment of a fair, competitive and uni-
fied labour market are increasingly important 
for China.
Guaranteeing equal opportunity. Ac-
cording to the hukou policy, a child’s hukou 
category is determined by that of the child’s 
parents. Thus, worker segmentation and a 
subsequent descent into poverty or the low-
wage trap may be passed from one generation 
to the next. Because the mechanism is virtu-
ally automatic, the disadvantaged are unable 
to escape the trap without assistance. There-
fore, to help the segmented workers avoid this 
fate, the government should endeavor to en-
sure fair and equal opportunity for all Chinese 
citizens.
In our opinion, the government could pro-
vide a health subsidy to the segmented work-
ers before they enter the labour market. After-
ward, when the workers enter the urban labour 
market, the government should assist the dis-
advantaged by providing on-the-job training. 
Such actions are basic to social equality and 
fundamental ways to assure fairness from the 
start. Additionally, to assist the young seg-
mented workers who have already joined the 
labour market, the government could focus on 
ways to increase their opportunities, personal 
development and income, including more vo-
cational training, better healthcare, increased 
job opportunities and more comprehensive 
social services (Li, 2011).
Furthermore, the government could pro-
mote job mobility among different social 
classes under the premise of a fair starting 
point to guarantee that each citizen has the 
opportunity to climb to the upper classes, par-
ticularly the segmented workers. Only in this 
way can we ensure that the disadvantaged are 
not destined to remain at the bottom of society 
and that the advantaged do not permanently 
occupy society’s highest ranks.
In conclusion, the government should de-
velop policies to provide an institution that 
operates fairly from the start and guarantee 
regular labour mobility among the different 
social classes, so as to overcome the vicious cy-
cle resulting from the hukou policy and other 
mechanisms, thus to realize a more inclusive 
growth and a benign social development in the 
future.
Tab. 3 Definition of variables
Variable definition
Dependent variable
lwage Dummy variable: low-wage workers =1. We define low-wage workers as the popula-
tion that below the minimum wage standard in each city.
Individual level variables
Sexm Dummy variable: male=1
Age Individuals’ age
Sage Age square
Marry status Dummy variable: being married=1
Education level Six level of education
Head Dummy variable: household head=1
Other variables
Regional effects Dummy variables for the province
Other effects Dummy variables for the ownership, occupation and sector
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